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Archive / FAA Pilot’s Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge / Pilot’s Handbook: Chapter 2 — Aeronautical Decision-Making

Chapter 2, Part 2

Aeronautical Decision-Making — Part 2

FAA-H-8083-25C (2023)

capabilities, etc. The scores are added and the overall score

falls into various ranges, with the range representative of

actions that a pilot imposes upon himself or herself.

Mitigating Risk

Risk assessment is only part of the equation. After

determining the level of risk, the pilot needs to mitigate the

risk. For example, the pilot flying from point A to point B (50

miles) in MVFR conditions has several ways to reduce risk:

• Wait for the weather to improve to good visual flight

rules (VFR) conditions.

• Take an instrument-rated pilot.

• Delay the flight.

• Cancel the flight.

• Drive.

One of the best ways single pilots can mitigate risk is to use

the IMSAFE checklist to determine physical and mental

readiness for flying:

1. Illness—Am I sick? Illness is an obvious pilot risk.

2. Medication—Am I taking any medicines that might

affect my judgment or make me drowsy?

3. Stress—Am I under psychological pressure from the

job? Do I have money, health, or family problems?

Stress causes concentration and performance problems.

While the regulations list medical conditions that

require grounding, stress is not among them. The pilot

should consider the effects of stress on performance.

4. Alcohol—Have I been drinking within 8 hours?

Within 24 hours? As little as one ounce of liquor, one

bottle of beer, or four ounces of wine can impair flying

skills. Alcohol also renders a pilot more susceptible

to disorientation and hypoxia.

5. Fatigue—Am I tired and not adequately rested?

Fatigue continues to be one of the most insidious

hazards to flight safety, as it may not be apparent to

a pilot until serious errors are made.

6. Emotion—Am I emotionally upset?

The PAVE Checklist

Another way to mitigate risk is to perceive hazards. By

incorporating the PAVE checklist into preflight planning,

the pilot divides the risks of flight into four categories: Pilot-

in-command (PIC), Aircraft, en Vironment, and External

pressures (PAVE) which form part of a pilot’s decision-

making process.

With the PAVE checklist, pilots have a simple way to

remember each category to examine for risk prior to each flight.

Once a pilot identifies the risks of a flight, he or she needs

to decide whether the risk, or combination of risks, can be

managed safely and successfully. If not, make the decision to

cancel the flight. If the pilot decides to continue with the flight,

he or she should develop strategies to mitigate the risks. One

way a pilot can control the risks is to set personal minimums

for items in each risk category. These are limits unique to that

individual pilot’s current level of experience and proficiency.

For example, the aircraft may have a maximum crosswind

component of 15 knots listed in the aircraft flight manual

(AFM), and the pilot has experience with 10 knots of direct

crosswind. It could be unsafe to exceed a 10 knot crosswind

component without additional training. Therefore, the 10 knot

crosswind experience level is that pilot’s personal limitation

until additional training with a certificated flight instructor

(CFI) provides the pilot with additional experience for flying

in crosswinds that exceed 10 knots.

One of the most important concepts that safe pilots

understand is the difference between what is “legal” in terms

of the regulations, and what is “smart” or “safe” in terms of

pilot experience and proficiency.

P = Pilot in Command (PIC)

The pilot is one of the risk factors in a flight. The pilot must

ask, “Am I ready for this trip?” in terms of experience,

recency, currency, physical, and emotional condition. The

IMSAFE checklist provides the answers.

A = Aircraft

What limitations will the aircraft impose upon the trip? Ask

the following questions:

• Is this the right aircraft for the flight?

• Am I familiar with and current in this aircraft? Aircraft

performance figures and the AFM are based on a brand

new aircraft flown by a professional test pilot. Keep

that in mind while assessing personal and aircraft

performance.

• Is this aircraft equipped for the flight? Instruments?

Lights? Navigation and communication equipment

adequate?

• Can this aircraft use the runways available for the trip

with an adequate margin of safety under the conditions

to be flown?

• Can this aircraft carry the planned load?

• Can this aircraft operate at the altitudes needed for the

trip?

• Does this aircraft have sufficient fuel capacity, with

reserves, for trip legs planned?

guidance? Is the terminal airport equipped with them?

Are they working? Will the pilot need to use the radio

to activate the airport lights?

• Check the Notices to Airmen (NOTAM) for closed

runways or airports. Look for runway or beacon lights

out, nearby towers, etc.

• Choose the flight route wisely. An engine failure gives

the nearby airports supreme importance.

• Are there shorter or obstructed fields at the destination

and/or alternate airports?

Airspace

• If the trip is over remote areas, is there appropriate

clothing, water, and survival gear onboard in the event

of a forced landing?

• If the trip includes flying over water or unpopulated

areas with the chance of losing visual reference to the

horizon, the pilot must be prepared to fly IFR.

• Check the airspace and any temporary flight restriction

(TFRs) along the route of flight.

Nighttime

Night flying requires special consideration.

• If the trip includes flying at night over water or

unpopulated areas with the chance of losing visual

reference to the horizon, the pilot must be prepared

to fly IFR.

• Will the flight conditions allow a safe emergency

landing at night?

• Perform preflight check of all aircraft lights, interior

and exterior, for a night flight. Carry at least two

flashlights—one for exterior preflight and a smaller

one that can be dimmed and kept nearby.

E = External Pressures

External pressures are influences external to the flight that

create a sense of pressure to complete a flight—often at the

expense of safety. Factors that can be external pressures

include the following:

• Someone waiting at the airport for the flight’s arrival

• A passenger the pilot does not want to disappoint

• The desire to demonstrate pilot qualifications

• The desire to impress someone (Probably the two most

dangerous words in aviation are “Watch this!”)

• The desire to satisfy a specific personal goal (“get-

home-itis,” “get-there-itis,” and “let’s-go-itis”)

• The pilot’s general goal-completion orientation

• Does the fuel quantity delivered match the fuel

quantity ordered?

V = EnVironment

Weather

Weather is a major environmental consideration. Earlier it was

suggested pilots set their own personal minimums, especially

when it comes to weather. As pilots evaluate the weather for

a particular flight, they should consider the following:

• What is the current ceiling and visibility? In

mountainous terrain, consider having higher

minimums for ceiling and visibility, particularly if

the terrain is unfamiliar.

• Consider the possibility that the weather may be

different than forecast. Have alternative plans and

be ready and willing to divert, should an unexpected

change occur.

• Consider the winds at the airports being used and the

strength of the crosswind component.

• If flying in mountainous terrain, consider whether

there are strong winds aloft. Strong winds in

mountainous terrain can cause severe turbulence and

downdrafts and be very hazardous for aircraft even

when there is no other significant weather.

• Are there any thunderstorms present or forecast?

• If there are clouds, is there any icing, current or

forecast? What is the temperature/dew point spread

and the current temperature at altitude? Can descent

be made safely all along the route?

• If icing conditions are encountered, is the pilot

experienced at operating the aircraft’s deicing or

anti-icing equipment? Is this equipment in good

condition and functional? For what icing conditions

is the aircraft rated, if any?

Terrain

Evaluation of terrain is another important component of

analyzing the flight environment.

• To avoid terrain and obstacles, especially at night or

in low visibility, determine safe altitudes in advance

by using the altitudes shown on VFR and IFR charts

during preflight planning.

• Use maximum elevation figures (MEFs) and other

easily obtainable data to minimize chances of an

inflight collision with terrain or obstacles.

Airport

• What lights are available at the destination and

alternate airports? VASI/PAPI or ILS glideslope

A pilot must continually make decisions about competency,

condition of health, mental and emotional state, level of fatigue,

and many other variables. For example, a pilot may be called

early in the morning to make a long flight. If a pilot has had only

a few hours of sleep and is concerned that the congestion

being experienced could be the onset of a cold, it would be

prudent to consider if the flight could be accomplished safely.

A pilot had only 4 hours of sleep the night before being asked

by the boss to fly to a meeting in a city 750 miles away. The

reported weather was marginal and not expected to improve.

After assessing fitness as a pilot, it was decided that it would

not be wise to make the flight. The boss was initially unhappy,

but later convinced by the pilot that the risks involved were

unacceptable.

Pilot

This encompasses many elements not pilot or airplane related.

It can include such factors as weather, air traffic control,

navigational aids (NAVAIDS), terrain, takeoff and landing

areas, and surrounding obstacles. Weather is one element that

can change drastically over time and distance.

A pilot was landing a small airplane just after a heavy jet had

departed a parallel runway. The pilot assumed that wake

turbulence would not be a problem since landings had been

performed under similar circumstances. Due to a combination

of prevailing winds and wake turbulence from the heavy jet

drifting across the landing runway, the airplane made a hard

landing. The pilot made an error when assessing the flight

environment.

Environment

Aircraft

A pilot will frequently base decisions on the evaluations of the

aircraft, such as performance, equipment, or airworthiness.

During a preflight, a pilot noticed a small amount of oil dripping

from the bottom of the cowling. Although the quantity of oil

seemed insignificant at the time, the pilot decided to delay the

takeoff and have a mechanic check the source of the oil.

The pilot’s good judgment was confirmed when the mechanic

found that one of the oil cooler hose fittings was loose.

External pressures

The interaction between the pilot, airplane, and the environment

is greatly influenced by the purpose of each flight operation.

The pilot must evaluate the three previous areas to decide on

the desirability of undertaking or continuing the flight as planned.

It is worth asking why the flight is being made, how critical is it to

maintain the schedule, and is the trip worth the risks?

On a ferry flight to deliver an airplane from the factory, in

marginal weather conditions, the pilot calculated the

groundspeed and determined that the airplane would arrive at

the destination with only 10 minutes of fuel remaining. The pilot

was determined to keep on schedule by trying to “stretch” the

fuel supply instead of landing to refuel. After landing with low

fuel state, the pilot realized that this could have easily resulted

in an emergency landing in deteriorating weather conditions.

This was a chance that was not worth taking to keep the

planned schedule.

Figure 2-7. The PAVE checklist.

• Emotional pressure associated with acknowledging

that skill and experience levels may be lower than a

pilot would like them to be. Pride can be a powerful

external factor!

Managing External Pressures

Management of external pressure is the single most important

key to risk management because it is the one risk factor

category that can cause a pilot to ignore all the other risk

factors. External pressures put time-related pressure on the

pilot and figure into a majority of accidents.

The use of personal standard operating procedures (SOPs) is

one way to manage external pressures. The goal is to supply a

release for the external pressures of a flight. These procedures

include but are not limited to:

• Allow time on a trip for an extra fuel stop or to make

an unexpected landing because of weather.

• Have alternate plans for a late arrival or make backup

airline reservations for must-be-there trips.

• For really important trips, plan to leave early enough

so that there would still be time to drive to the

destination, if necessary.

• Advise those who are waiting at the destination that

the arrival may be delayed. Know how to notify them

when delays are encountered.

• Manage passengers’ expectations. Make sure

passengers know that they might not arrive on a firm

schedule, and if they must arrive by a certain time,

they should make alternative plans.

• Eliminate pressure to return home, even on a casual

day flight, by carrying a small overnight kit containing

prescriptions, contact lens solutions, toiletries, or other

necessities on every flight.

The key to managing external pressure is to be ready for

and accept delays. Remember that people get delayed when

traveling on airlines, driving a car, or taking a bus. The pilot’s

goal is to manage risk, not create hazards. [Figure 2-7]

Human Factors

Why are human conditions, such as fatigue, complacency

and stress, so important in aviation? These conditions, along

with many others, are called human factors. Human factors

directly cause or contribute to many aviation accidents and

Figure 2-8. Human factors effects pilots, aviation maintenance technicians (AMTs) and air traffic control (ATC).

have been documented as a primary contributor to more than

70 percent of aircraft accidents.

Typically, human factor incidents/accidents are associated

with flight operations but recently have also become a major

concern in aviation maintenance and air traffic management

as well. [Figure 2-8] Over the past several years, the FAA has

made the study and research of human factors a top priority

by working closely with engineers, pilots, mechanics, and

ATC to apply the latest knowledge about human factors in

an effort to help operators and maintainers improve safety

and efficiency in their daily operations.

Human factors science, or human factors technologies,

is a multidisciplinary field incorporating contributions

from psychology, engineering, industrial design, statistics,

operations research, and anthropometry. It is a term that

covers the science of understanding the properties of

human capability, the application of this understanding to

the design, development and deployment of systems and

services, and the art of ensuring successful application of

human factor principles into all aspects of aviation to include

pilots, ATC, and aviation maintenance. Human factors is

often considered synonymous with CRM or maintenance

resource management (MRM) but is really much broader in

both its knowledge base and scope. Human factors involves

gathering research specific to certain situations (i.e., flight,

maintenance, stress levels, knowledge) about human abilities,

limitations, and other characteristics and applying it to tool

design, machines, systems, tasks, jobs, and environments

to produce safe, comfortable, and effective human use. The

entire aviation community benefits greatly from human

factors research and development as it helps better understand

how humans can most safely and efficiently perform their

jobs and improve the tools and systems in which they interact.

Human Behavior

Studies of human behavior have tried to determine an

individual’s predisposition to taking risks and the level of

an individual’s involvement in accidents. In 1951, a study

regarding injury-prone children was published by Elizabeth

Mechem Fuller and Helen B. Baune, of the University of

Minnesota. The study was comprised of two separate groups

of second grade students. Fifty-five students were considered

accident repeaters and 48 students had no accidents. Both

groups were from the same school of 600 and their family

demographics were similar.

The accident-free group showed a superior knowledge

of safety, was considered industrious and cooperative

with others, but were not considered physically inclined.

The accident-repeater group had better gymnastic skills,

was considered aggressive and impulsive, demonstrated

rebellious behavior when under stress, were poor losers, and

liked to be the center of attention. One interpretation of this

data—an adult predisposition to injury stems from childhood

behavior and environment—leads to the conclusion that

any pilot group should be comprised only of pilots who are

safety-conscious, industrious, and cooperative.

Clearly, this is not only an inaccurate inference, it is

impossible. Pilots are drawn from the general population and

exhibit all types of personality traits. Thus, it is important that

good decision-making skills be taught to all pilots.

Historically, the term “pilot error” has been used to describe

an accident in which an action or decision made by the

pilot was the cause or a contributing factor that led to the

accident. This definition also includes the pilot’s failure

to make a correct decision or take proper action. From a

broader perspective, the phrase “human factors related” more

aptly describes these accidents. A single decision or event

does not lead to an accident, but a series of events and the

resultant decisions together form a chain of events leading

to an outcome.

In his article “Accident-Prone Pilots,” Dr. Patrick R. Veillette

uses the history of “Captain Everyman” to demonstrate how

aircraft accidents are caused more by a chain of poor choices

rather than one single poor choice. In the case of Captain

Everyman, after a gear-up landing accident, he became

involved in another accident while taxiing a Beech 58P Baron

out of the ramp. Interrupted by a radio call from the dispatcher,

Everyman neglected to complete the fuel cross-feed check

before taking off. Everyman, who was flying solo, left the

right-fuel selector in the cross-feed position. Once aloft and

cruising, he noticed a right roll tendency and corrected with

aileron trim. He did not realize that both engines were feeding

off the left wing’s tank, making the wing lighter.

After two hours of flight, the right engine quit when

Everyman was flying along a deep canyon gorge. While he

was trying to troubleshoot the cause of the right engine’s

failure, the left engine quit. Everyman landed the aircraft on

a river sand bar but it sank into ten feet of water.

Several years later Everyman flew a de Havilland Twin

Otter to deliver supplies to a remote location. When he

returned to home base and landed, the aircraft veered sharply

to the left, departed the runway, and ran into a marsh 375

feet from the runway. The airframe and engines sustained

considerable damage. Upon inspecting the wreck, accident

investigators found the nose wheel steering tiller in the fully

deflected position. Both the after takeoff and before landing

checklists require the tiller to be placed in the neutral position.

Everyman had overlooked this item.

Now, is Everyman accident prone or just unlucky? Skipping

details on a checklist appears to be a common theme in the

preceding accidents. While most pilots have made similar

mistakes, these errors were probably caught prior to a mishap

due to extra margin, good warning systems, a sharp copilot,

or just good luck. What makes a pilot less prone to accidents?

The successful pilot possesses the ability to concentrate,

manage workloads, and monitor and perform several

simultaneous tasks. Some of the latest psychological

screenings used in aviation test applicants for their ability

to multitask, measuring both accuracy, as well as the

individual’s ability to focus attention on several subjects

simultaneously. The FAA oversaw an extensive research

study on the similarities and dissimilarities of accident-free

pilots and those who were not. The project surveyed over

4,000 pilots, half of whom had “clean” records while the

other half had been involved in an accident.

Five traits were discovered in pilots prone to having

accidents. These pilots:

• Have disdain toward rules

• Have very high correlation between accidents on their

flying records and safety violations on their driving

records

• Frequently fall into the “thrill and adventure seeking”

personality category

• Are impulsive rather than methodical and disciplined,

both in their information gathering and in the speed

and selection of actions to be taken

• Have a disregard for or tend to under utilize outside

sources of information, including copilots, flight

attendants, flight service personnel, flight instructors,

and ATC

The Decision-Making Process

An understanding of the decision-making process provides

the pilot with a foundation for developing ADM and SRM

skills. While some situations, such as engine failure, require an

immediate pilot response using established procedures, there is

usually time during a flight to analyze any changes that occur,

gather information, and assess risks before reaching a decision.

Risk management and risk intervention is much more than the

simple definitions of the terms might suggest. Risk management

and risk intervention are decision-making processes designed

to systematically identify hazards, assess the degree of risk, and

Figure 2-9. The Five Ps checklist.

THE PLAN THE PLANE THE PILOT

THE

PASSENGERS

THE

PROGRAMMING

The SRM Five “Ps” Check

determine the best course of action. These processes involve

the identification of hazards, followed by assessments of the

risks, analysis of the controls, making control decisions, using

the controls, and monitoring the results.

The steps leading to this decision constitute a decision-

making process. Three models of a structured framework

for problem-solving and decision-making are the 5P, the 3P

using PAVE, CARE and TEAM, and the DECIDE models.

They provide assistance in organizing the decision process.

All these models have been identified as helpful to the single

pilot in organizing critical decisions.

Single-Pilot Resource Management (SRM)

Single-Pilot Resource Management (SRM) is about how to

gather information, analyze it, and make decisions. Learning

how to identify problems, analyze the information, and make

informed and timely decisions is not as straightforward as the

training involved in learning specific maneuvers. Learning

how to judge a situation and “how to think” in the endless

variety of situations encountered while flying out in the “real

world” is more difficult.

There is no one right answer in ADM, rather each pilot is

expected to analyze each situation in light of experience

level, personal minimums, and current physical and mental

readiness level, and make his or her own decision.

The 5 Ps Check

SRM sounds good on paper, but it requires a way for pilots

to understand and use it in their daily flights. One practical

application is called the “Five Ps (5 Ps).” [Figure 2-9] The

5 Ps consist of “the Plan, the Plane, the Pilot, the Passengers,

and the Programming.” Each of these areas consists of a set

of challenges and opportunities that every pilot encounters.

Each challenge and opportunity can substantially increase or

decrease the risk of successfully completing the flight based

on the pilot’s ability to make informed and timely decisions.

The 5 Ps are used to evaluate the pilot’s current situation at

key decision points during the flight or when an emergency

arises. These decision points include preflight, pretakeoff,

hourly or at the midpoint of the flight, pre-descent, and just

prior to the final approach fix or for VFR operations, just

prior to entering the traffic pattern.

The 5 Ps are based on the idea that pilots have essentially

five variables that impact his or her environment and forcing

him or her to make a single critical decision, or several less

critical decisions, that when added together can create a

critical outcome. These variables are the Plan, the Plane, the

Pilot, the Passengers, and the Programming. This concept

stems from the belief that current decision-making models

tended to be reactionary in nature. A change has to occur

and be detected to drive a risk management decision by the

pilot. For instance, many pilots complete risk management

sheets prior to takeoff. These form a catalog of risks

that may be encountered that day. Each of these risks is

assigned a numerical value. If the total of these numerical

values exceeds a predetermined level, the flight is altered or

cancelled. Informal research shows that while these are useful

documents for teaching risk factors, they are almost never

used outside of formal training programs. The 5P concept is

an attempt to take the information contained in those sheets

and in the other available models and use it.

The 5P concept relies on the pilot to adopt a “scheduled”

review of the critical variables at points in the flight where

decisions are most likely to be effective. For instance, the

easiest point to cancel a flight due to bad weather is before the

pilot and passengers walk out the door and load the aircraft.

So the first decision point is preflight in the flight planning

room, where all the information is readily available to make

a sound decision, and where communication and Fixed

Base Operator (FBO) services are readily available to make

alternate travel plans.

The second easiest point in the flight to make a critical safety

decision is just prior to takeoff. Few pilots have ever had

to make an “emergency takeoff.” While the point of the 5P

check is to help the pilot fly, the correct application of the 5

P before takeoff is to assist in making a reasoned go/no-go

decision based on all the information available. That decision

will usually be to “go,” with certain restrictions and changes,

but may also be a “no-go.” The key idea is that these two

points in the process of flying are critical go/no-go points on

each and every flight.

The third place to review the 5 Ps is at the midpoint of the

flight. Often, pilots may wait until the Automated Terminal

information Service (ATIS) is in range to check weather, yet,

at this point in the flight, many good options have already

passed behind the aircraft and pilot. Additionally, fatigue

and low-altitude hypoxia serve to rob the pilot of much of

his or her energy by the end of a long and tiring flight day.

This leads to a transition from a decision-making mode to an

acceptance mode on the part of the pilot. If the flight is longer

than 2 hours, the 5 P check should be conducted hourly.

The last two decision points are just prior to descent into the

terminal area and just prior to the final approach fix, or if

VFR, just prior to entering the traffic pattern as preparations

for landing commence. Most pilots execute approaches with

the expectation that they will land out of the approach every

time. A healthier approach requires the pilot to assume that

changing conditions (the 5 Ps again) will cause the pilot to

divert or execute the missed approach on every approach.

This keeps the pilot alert to all manner of conditions that

may increase risk and threaten the safe conduct of the flight.

Diverting from cruise altitude saves fuel, allows unhurried

use of the autopilot and is less reactive in nature. Diverting

from the final approach fix, while more difficult, still allows

the pilot to plan and coordinate better, rather than executing

a futile missed approach. Let’s look at a detailed discussion

of each of the Five Ps.

The Plan

The “Plan” can also be called the mission or the task. It

contains the basic elements of cross-country planning,

weather, route, fuel, publications currency, etc. The “Plan”

should be reviewed and updated several times during the

course of the flight. A delayed takeoff due to maintenance,

fast moving weather, and a short notice TFR may all radically

alter the plan. The “plan” is not only about the flight plan,

but also all the events that surround the flight and allow the

pilot to accomplish the mission. The plan is always being

updated and modified and is especially responsive to changes

in the other four remaining Ps. If for no other reason, the 5 P

check reminds the pilot that the day’s flight plan is real life

and subject to change at any time.

Obviously, weather is a huge part of any plan. The addition

of datalink weather information gives the advanced avionics

pilot a real advantage in inclement weather, but only if the

pilot is trained to retrieve and evaluate the weather in real

time without sacrificing situational awareness. And of course,

weather information should drive a decision, even if that

decision is to continue on the current plan. Pilots of aircraft

without datalink weather should get updated weather in flight

through an FSS and/or Flight Watch.

The Plane

Both the “plan” and the “plane” are fairly familiar to most

pilots. The “plane” consists of the usual array of mechanical

and cosmetic issues that every aircraft pilot, owner, or

operator can identify. With the advent of advanced avionics,

the “plane” has expanded to include database currency,

automation status, and emergency backup systems that were

unknown a few years ago. Much has been written about

single pilot IFR flight, both with and without an autopilot.

While this is a personal decision, it is just that—a decision.

Low IFR in a non-autopilot equipped aircraft may depend

on several of the other Ps to be discussed. Pilot proficiency,

currency, and fatigue are among them.

The Pilot

Flying, especially when business transportation is involved,

can expose a pilot to risks such as high altitudes, long trips

requiring significant endurance, and challenging weather.

Advanced avionics, when installed, can expose a pilot to high

stresses because of the inherent additional capabilities which

are available. When dealing with pilot risk, it is always best

to consult the “IMSAFE” checklist (see page 2-6).

The combination of late nights, pilot fatigue, and the effects

of sustained flight above 5,000 feet may cause pilots to

become less discerning, less critical of information, less

decisive, and more compliant and accepting. Just as the most

critical portion of the flight approaches (for instance a night

instrument approach, in the weather, after a 4-hour flight),

the pilot’s guard is down the most. The 5 P process helps a

pilot recognize the physiological challenges that they may

face towards the end of the flight prior to takeoff and allows

them to update personal conditions as the flight progresses.

Once risks are identified, the pilot is in a better place to

make alternate plans that lessen the effect of these factors

and provide a safer solution.

The Passengers

One of the key differences between CRM and SRM is the

way passengers interact with the pilot. The pilot of a highly

capable single-engine aircraft maintains a much more personal

relationship with the passengers as he/she is positioned within

an arm’s reach of them throughout the flight.

The necessity of the passengers to make airline connections

or important business meetings in a timely manner enters

into this pilot’s decision-making loop. Consider a flight

to Dulles Airport in which and the passengers, both close

friends and business partners, need to get to Washington,

D.C. for an important meeting. The weather is VFR all the

way to southern Virginia, then turns to low IFR as the pilot

approaches Dulles. A pilot employing the 5 P approach

might consider reserving a rental car at an airport in northern

North Carolina or southern Virginia to coincide with a

refueling stop. Thus, the passengers have a way to get to

Washington, and the pilot has an out to avoid being pressured

into continuing the flight if the conditions do not improve.

Original source PDFPublished from pages 8–14 of the recorded source chapter.
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