Results of the Study
When pilots who had flown EFIS for several years were
required to fly various maneuvers manually, the aircraft
parameters and flight control inputs clearly showed some
erosion of flying skills. During normal maneuvers, such as
turns to headings without a flight director, the EFIS group
exhibited somewhat greater deviations than the analog group.
Most of the time, the deviations were within the practical test
standards (PTS), but the pilots definitely did not keep on the
localizer and glideslope as smoothly as the analog group.
The differences in hand-flying skills between the two groups
became more significant during abnormal maneuvers, such as
accelerated descent profiles known as “slam-dunks.” When
given close crossing restrictions, the analog crews were more
adept at the mental math and usually maneuvered the aircraft
in a smoother manner to make the restriction. On the other
hand, the EFIS crews tended to go “heads down” and tried
to solve the crossing restriction on the FMS. [Figure 2-22]
Another situation used in the simulator experiment reflected
real world changes in approach that are common and can
be assigned on short notice. Once again, the analog crews
transitioned more easily to the parallel runway’s localizer,
whereas the EFIS crews had a much more difficult time with
the pilot going head down for a significant amount of time
trying to program the new approach into the FMS.
While a pilot’s lack of familiarity with the EFIS is often
an issue, the approach would have been made easier by
disengaging the automated system and manually flying the
approach. At the time of this study, the general guidelines
in the industry were to let the automated system do as much
of the flying as possible. That view has since changed and
it is recommended that pilots use their best judgment when
choosing which level of automation will most efficiently do
the task considering the workload and situational awareness.
Emergency maneuvers clearly broadened the difference in
manual flying skills between the two groups. In general, the
analog pilots tended to fly raw data, so when they were given
an emergency, such as an engine failure, and were instructed
to fly the maneuver without a flight director, they performed
it expertly. By contrast, SOP for EFIS operations at the time
was to use the flight director. When EFIS crews had their flight
directors disabled, their eye scan again began a more erratic
searching pattern and their manual flying subsequently suffered.
Those who reviewed the data saw that the EFIS pilots who
better managed the automation also had better flying skills.
While the data did not reveal whether those skills preceded
or followed automation, it did indicate that automation
management needed to be improved. Recommended “best
practices” and procedures have remedied some of the earlier
problems with automation.
Pilots must maintain their flight skills and ability to maneuver
aircraft manually within the standards set forth in the PTS. It
is recommended that pilots of automated aircraft occasionally
disengage the automation and manually fly the aircraft to
maintain stick-and-rudder proficiency. It is imperative that
the pilots understand that the EFD adds to the overall quality
of the flight experience, but it can also lead to catastrophe if
not utilized properly. At no time is the moving map meant to
substitute for a VFR sectional or low altitude en route chart.
Equipment Use
Autopilot Systems
In a single-pilot environment, an autopilot system can greatly
reduce workload. [Figure 2-23] As a result, the pilot is free
to focus his or her attention on other flight deck duties. This
can improve situational awareness and reduce the possibility
of a CFIT accident. While the addition of an autopilot may
certainly be considered a risk control measure, the real
challenge comes in determining the impact of an inoperative
unit. If the autopilot is known to be inoperative prior to
departure, this may factor into the evaluation of other risks.
For example, the pilot may be planning for a VHF
omnidirectional range (VOR) approach down to minimums
on a dark night into an unfamiliar airport. In such a case, the
pilot may have been relying heavily on a functioning autopilot
capable of flying a coupled approach. This would free the
pilot to monitor aircraft performance. A malfunctioning
autopilot could be the single factor that takes this from a
medium to a serious risk. At this point, an alternative needs
to be considered. On the other hand, if the autopilot were to
fail at a critical (high workload) portion of this same flight,
the pilot must be prepared to take action. Instead of simply
being an inconvenience, this could quickly turn into an
emergency if not properly handled. The best way to ensure
a pilot is prepared for such an event is to carefully study the
issue prior to departure and determine well in advance how
an autopilot failure is to be handled.
Familiarity
As previously discussed, pilot familiarity with all equipment
is critical in optimizing both safety and efficiency. If a pilot is
unfamiliar with any aircraft systems, this will add to workload
and may contribute to a loss of situational awareness. This
level of proficiency is critical and should be looked upon as
a requirement, not unlike carrying an adequate supply of fuel.
As a result, pilots should not look upon unfamiliarity with the
aircraft and its systems as a risk control measure, but instead as
a hazard with high risk potential. Discipline is key to success.
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Figure 2-22. Two similar flight decks equipped with the same information two different ways, analog and digital. What are they indicating?
Chances are that the analog pilot will review the top display before the bottom display. Conversely, the digitally trained pilot will review
the instrument panel on the bottom first.
Figure 2-23. An example of an autopilot system.
Figure 2-24. Examples of different platforms. Top to bottom are the
Beechcraft Baron G58, Cirrus SR22, and Cirrus Entega.
Respect for Onboard Systems
Automation can assist the pilot in many ways, but a
thorough understanding of the system(s) in use is essential
to gaining the benefits it can offer. Understanding leads
to respect, which is achieved through discipline and the
mastery of the onboard systems. It is important to fly the
aircraft using minimal information from the primary flight
display (PFD). This includes turns, climbs, descents, and
being able to fly approaches.
Reinforcement of Onboard Suites
The use of an EFD may not seem intuitive, but competency
becomes better with understanding and practice. Computer-
based software and incremental training help the pilot become
comfortable with the onboard suites. Then the pilot needs
to practice what was learned in order to gain experience.
Reinforcement not only yields dividends in the use of
automation, it also reduces workload significantly.
Getting Beyond Rote Workmanship
The key to working effectively with automation is getting
beyond the sequential process of executing an action. If a
pilot has to analyze what key to push next, or always uses
the same sequence of keystrokes when others are available,
he or she may be trapped in a rote process. This mechanical
process indicates a shallow understanding of the system.
Again, the desire is to become competent and know what to
do without having to think about, “what keystroke is next.”
Operating the system with competency and comprehension
benefits a pilot when situations become more diverse and
tasks increase.
Understand the Platform
Contrary to popular belief, flight in aircraft equipped with
different electronic management suites requires the same
attention as aircraft equipped with analog instrumentation
and a conventional suite of avionics. The pilot should review
and understand the different ways in which EFD are used in
a particular aircraft. [Figure 2-24]
The following are two simple rules for use of an EFD:
• Be able to fly the aircraft to the standards in the PTS.
Although this may seem insignificant, knowing how to
fly the aircraft to a standard makes a pilot’s airmanship
smoother and allows him or her more time to attend
to the system instead of managing multiple tasks.
• Read and understand the installed electronic flight
systems manuals to include the use of the autopilot
and the other onboard electronic management tools.
Managing Aircraft Automation
Before any pilot can master aircraft automation, he or she
must first know how to fly the aircraft. Maneuvers training
remains an important component of flight training because
almost 40 percent of all GA accidents take place in the
landing phase, one realm of flight that still does not involve
programming a computer to execute. Another 15 percent
of all GA accidents occurs during takeoff and initial climb.
An advanced avionics safety issue identified by the FAA
concerns pilots who apparently develop an unwarranted
over-reliance in their avionics and the aircraft, believing
that the equipment will compensate for pilot shortcomings.
Related to the over-reliance is the role of ADM, which is
probably the most significant factor in the GA accident record
of high performance aircraft used for cross-country flight.
The FAA advanced avionics aircraft safety study found that
poor decision-making seems to afflict new advanced avionics
pilots at a rate higher than that of GA as a whole. The review
of advanced avionics accidents cited in this study shows the
majority are not caused by something directly related to the
aircraft, but by the pilot’s lack of experience and a chain of
poor decisions. One consistent theme in many of the fatal
accidents is continued VFR flight into IMC.
Thus, pilot skills for normal and emergency operations hinge
not only on mechanical manipulation of the stick and rudder,
but also include the mental mastery of the EFD. Three key
flight management skills are needed to fly the advanced
avionics safely: information, automation, and risk.
Information Management
For the newly transitioning pilot, the PFD, MFD, and GPS/
VHF navigator screens seem to offer too much information
presented in colorful menus and submenus. In fact, the pilot
may be drowning in information but unable to find a specific
piece of information. It might be helpful to remember these
systems are similar to computers that store some folders on
a desktop and some within a hierarchy.
The first critical information management skill for flying with
advanced avionics is to understand the system at a conceptual
level. Remembering how the system is organized helps the
pilot manage the available information. It is important to
understanding that learning knob-and-dial procedures is not
enough. Learning more about how advanced avionics systems
work leads to better memory for procedures and allows pilots
to solve problems they have not seen before.
There are also limits to understanding. It is generally impossible
to understand all of the behaviors of a complex avionics
system. Knowing to expect surprises and to continually learn
new things is more effective than attempting to memorize
mechanical manipulation of the knobs. Simulation software
and books on the specific system used are of great value.
The second critical information management skill is stop,
look, and read. Pilots new to advanced avionics often become
fixated on the knobs and try to memorize each and every
sequence of button pushes, pulls, and turns. A far better
strategy for accessing and managing the information available
in advanced avionics computers is to stop, look, and read.
Reading before pushing, pulling, or twisting can often save
a pilot some trouble.
Once behind the display screens on an advanced avionics
aircraft, the pilot’s goal is to meter, manage, and prioritize
the information flow to accomplish specific tasks.
Certificated flight instructors (CFIs), as well as pilots
transitioning to advanced avionics, will find it helpful to
corral the information flow. This is possible through such
tactics as configuring the aspects of the PFD and MFD
screens according to personal preferences. For example,
most systems offer map orientation options that include
“north up,” “track up,” “DTK” (desired track up), and
“heading up.” Another tactic is to decide, when possible,
how much (or how little) information to display. Pilots can
also tailor the information displayed to suit the needs of a
specific flight.
Information flow can also be managed for a specific
operation. The pilot has the ability to prioritize information
for a timely display of exactly the information needed for any
given flight operation. Examples of managing information
display for a specific operation include:
• Program map scale settings for en route versus
terminal area operation.
• Utilize the terrain awareness page on the MFD for a
night or IMC flight in or near the mountains.
• Use the nearest airports inset on the PFD at night or
over inhospitable terrain.
• Program the weather datalink set to show echoes and
METAR status flags.
Enhanced Situational Awareness
An advanced avionics aircraft offers increased safety with
enhanced situational awareness. Although aircraft flight
manuals (AFM) explicitly prohibit using the moving map,
topography, terrain awareness, traffic, and weather datalink
displays as the primary data source, these tools nonetheless
give the pilot unprecedented information for enhanced
situational awareness. Without a well-planned information
management strategy, these tools also make it easy for an
unwary pilot to slide into the complacent role of passenger
in command.
Consider the pilot whose navigational information
management strategy consists solely of following the
magenta line on the moving map. He or she can easily fly
into geographic or regulatory disaster, if the straight-line GPS
course goes through high terrain or prohibited airspace, or if
the moving map display fails.
A good strategy for maintaining situational awareness
information management should include practices that help
ensure that awareness is enhanced, not diminished, by the use
of automation. Two basic procedures are to always double-
check the system and verbal callouts. At a minimum, ensure
the presentation makes sense. Was the correct destination fed
into the navigation system? Callouts—even for single-pilot
operations—are an excellent way to maintain situational
awareness, as well as manage information.
Other ways to maintain situational awareness include:
• Perform verification check of all programming. Before
departure, check all information programmed while
on the ground.
• Check the flight routing. Before departure, ensure all
routing matches the planned flight route. Enter the
planned route and legs, to include headings and leg
length, on a paper log. Use this log to evaluate what
has been programmed. If the two do not match, do not
assume the computer data is correct, double check the
computer entry.
• Verify waypoints.
• Make use of all onboard navigation equipment. For
example, use VOR to back up GPS and vice versa.
• Match the use of the automated system with pilot
proficiency. Stay within personal limitations.
• Plan a realistic flight route to maintain situational
awareness. For example, although the onboard
equipment allows a direct flight from Denver,
Colorado, to Destin, Florida, the likelihood of
rerouting around Eglin Air Force Base’s airspace is
high.
• Be ready to verify computer data entries. For example,
incorrect keystrokes could lead to loss of situational
awareness because the pilot may not recognize errors
made during a high workload period.
Automation Management
Advanced avionics offer multiple levels of automation, from
strictly manual flight to highly automated flight. No one level
of automation is appropriate for all flight situations, but in
order to avoid potentially dangerous distractions when flying
with advanced avionics, the pilot must know how to manage
the course deviation indicator (CDI), the navigation source,
and the autopilot. It is important for a pilot to know the
peculiarities of the particular automated system being used.
This ensures the pilot knows what to expect, how to monitor
for proper operation, and promptly take appropriate action if
the system does not perform as expected.
For example, at the most basic level, managing the autopilot
means knowing at all times which modes are engaged
and which modes are armed to engage. The pilot needs to
verify that armed functions (e.g., navigation tracking or
altitude capture) engage at the appropriate time. Automation
management is another good place to practice the callout
technique, especially after arming the system to make a
change in course or altitude.
In advanced avionics aircraft, proper automation management
also requires a thorough understanding of how the autopilot
interacts with the other systems. For example, with some
autopilots, changing the navigation source on the e-HSI from
GPS to LOC or VOR while the autopilot is engaged in NAV
(course tracking mode) causes the autopilot’s NAV mode to
disengage. The autopilot’s lateral control will default to ROL
(wing level) until the pilot takes action to reengage the NAV
mode to track the desired navigation source.
Risk Management
Risk management is the last of the three flight management
skills needed for mastery of the glass flight deck aircraft. The
enhanced situational awareness and automation capabilities
offered by a glass flight deck airplane vastly expand its safety
and utility, especially for personal transportation use. At the
same time, there is some risk that lighter workloads could
lead to complacency.
Humans are characteristically poor monitors of automated
systems. When asked to passively monitor an automated
system for faults, abnormalities, or other infrequent events,
humans perform poorly. The more reliable the system, the
poorer the human performance. For example, the pilot only
monitors a backup alert system, rather than the situation
that the alert system is designed to safeguard. It is a paradox
of automation that technically advanced avionics can both
increase and decrease pilot awareness.
It is important to remember that EFDs do not replace basic
flight knowledge and skills. They are a tool for improving
flight safety. Risk increases when the pilot believes the gadgets
compensate for lack of skill and knowledge. It is especially
important to recognize there are limits to what the electronic
systems in any light GA aircraft can do. Being PIC requires
sound ADM, which sometimes means saying “no” to a flight.
Risk is also increased when the pilot fails to monitor the
systems. By failing to monitor the systems and failing to
check the results of the processes, the pilot becomes detached
from the aircraft operation and slides into the complacent role
of passenger in command. Complacency led to tragedy in a
1999 aircraft accident.
In Colombia, a multi-engine aircraft crewed with two pilots
struck the face of the Andes Mountains. Examination of
their FMS revealed they entered a waypoint into the FMS
incorrectly by one degree resulting in a flight path taking
them to a point 60 NM off their intended course. The pilots
were equipped with the proper charts, their route was posted
on the charts, and they had a paper navigation log indicating
the direction of each leg. They had all the tools to manage
and monitor their flight, but instead allowed the automation
to fly and manage itself. The system did exactly what it was
programmed to do; it flew on a programmed course into a
mountain resulting in multiple deaths. The pilots simply failed
to manage the system and inherently created their own hazard.
Although this hazard was self-induced, what is notable is the
risk the pilots created through their own inattention. By failing
to evaluate each turn made at the direction of automation, the
pilots maximized risk instead of minimizing it. In this case, a
totally avoidable accident become a tragedy through simple
pilot error and complacency.
For the GA pilot transitioning to automated systems, it is
helpful to note that all human activity involving technical
devices entails some element of risk. Knowledge, experience,
and mission requirements tilt the odds in favor of safe and
successful flights. The advanced avionics aircraft offers
many new capabilities and simplifies the basic flying tasks,
but only if the pilot is properly trained and all the equipment
is working as advertised.
Chapter Summary
This chapter focused on helping the pilot improve his or
her ADM skills with the goal of mitigating the risk factors
associated with flight in both classic and automated aircraft.
In the end, the discussion is not so much about aircraft, but
about the people who fly them.